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Abstract
We propose an evolutionary approach for studying the dynamics of interaction of
strategic agents that interact in a marketplace. The goal is to learn which agent
strategies are most suited by observing the distribution of the agents that survive
in the market over extended periods of time. We present experimental results from
a simulated market, where multiple service providers compete for customers using
different deployment and pricing schemes. The results show that heterogeneous
strategies evolve and co-exist in the same market.
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1 Introduction
The approach to the study of agent decision making that we propose in this
paper is based on a large-scale evolutionary simulation environment [2]. The
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rationale behind our choice of an evolutionary framework is that it provides
results without requiring an overly complex theory of agent motivation, op-
timization criteria, or strategic interaction. The framework is determined by
the motives of individual agents, the rules of agents interactions, and the laws
governing survival and creation of new agents. Given that, the evolution of
the system provides dynamic information on the macroscopic behaviors of the
agents society. For an explanation of the relation between micromotives of
agents and macrobehavior see [17].
Evolutionary frameworks have been used extensively in Economics [12,6,16,19].
One reason is that economists have long recognized the usefulness of compu-
tational systems for rigorous studies through controlled experimentation (see,
for example, [10]). Evolutionary systems are relatively straightforward to con-
struct, and, at the same time, they provide a viable tool for experimentation.
Using an evolutionary approach allows one to analyze how different strategies
change as the result of interactions among many agents over long periods of
time.
A drawback of most evolutionary systems is that they need a homogeneous
representation of the strategies used by the agents. The homogeneity require-
ment is dictated by the agent reproduction rules. We propose an extension
that allows one to use strategies that are represented heterogeneously, and
we illustrate our ideas with a case study of a society of service providers and
customers.
Our proposed extension adds a layer of evolutionary learning atop disjointly
evolving types of agents that use different strategies. Every type of agent
maintains its separate source of “genetic” information. This information could
be a gene pool, if the type is based on the genetic algorithms paradigm; it could
be some statistical data, as it is the case in the test model we introduce later
in this paper; it could even be a neural network, which is continuously trained
on the performance of its “children.”
The purpose of the additional evolutionary layer is to learn the probabilities
with which representatives of each type should enter the market, by observ-
ing the distribution of surviving agents by type. Each time a new agent is
introduced to the market, the top layer decides on its type and uses the cor-
responding reproduction rule. Agents who fail to satisfy a predefined perfor-
mance criterion are removed at regular time intervals and, eventually, replaced
by more fit entities.
We introduce our case study, a test model called Citysim, in Section 3 and
we present an analytical model. We illustrate the idea of the two-layered evo-
lutionary framework in greater detail in Section 4. In Section 5 we present
experimental results obtained using the evolutionary framework and examine
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the distribution of different strategies over a wide range of initial conditions.
The results show that it is possible for heterogenous strategies to coexist in
the market and to evolve to occupy specific niches. For reading convenience,
we present a summary of our notation in the Appendix.
2 Related Work
Joshua Epstein and Rob Axtell have developed an evolutionary bottom-up
agent-based computational framework, Sugarscape [6], for the study of human
social phenomena such as trade, migration, group formation, combat, inter-
action with an environment, transmission of culture, propagation of disease,
and population dynamics to grow an agent economy from scratch. Sugarscape
showed successfully that an evolutionary framework without any traditional
human made assumptions can grow and deliver meaningful results.
Understanding collective interactions among agents that dynamically price
services or goods is discussed in [7], where several pricing strategies are com-
pared. Because of the complexity of providing an analytical treatment, the
study is limited to a small number of agents. The major difference between
their pricing strategies and the strategies our agents use is that transporta-
tion costs and geographical locations are important for us, but are not relevant
when buying and selling information.
A simulation based approach to study dynamic pricing strategies in finite time
horizon markets is described in [5]. The study uses a market simulator and
simple strategies. The results are evaluated in terms of overall profit, but there
are so many variables in the simulation that it is hard to assess the generality of
the results obtained. One of the advantages of using an evolutionary framework
like we do is that it simplifies experimenting with a variety of parameters.
An important result of these studies is that a Nash equilibrium is unlikely
to exist in a market where customers look for the lowest price and suppliers
adjust their prices dynamically. Another important result is that even simple
strategies can be quite effective. For instance, Cliff’s [3] Zero-Intelligence Plus
trader agents have minimal intelligence, yet they have been successfully used
in continuous double auctions, where they performed very well even when
compared to human traders [4].
The use of evolutionary methods is proposed in [14], where the evolution of
the agent population as they adapt their strategy by observing what happens
in the environment is simulated. Cliff [?] uses genetic algorithms to learn the
parameters that control how his trader agents evolve their pricing strategies.
Along similar lines, an evolutionary system based on Genetic Programming is
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presented in [15]. The major difference with the work presented here, is that
we aim at providing a methodology for extending theoretical modeling to deal
effectively with complex multi-agent systems with a large number of agents.
In [?], an evolutionary system is used to model changes in the use of land, in
particular to model deforestation in Yucatan.
Studying such systems analytically is often impossible. There have been a
few attempts to model very large multi-agent systems at the macroscopic
level. Shehory [18] models them using ideas from classical mechanics. Goal
satisfaction is modeled by collisions between dynamic particles, the agents,
and static particles, the goals. The method requires a measure of distance to
the goal, which is hard to do except in cases where agents operate in a cartesian
environment. The methodology presented in [8] is limited to systems that obey
the Markov property, i.e. such that the agent’s future state depends only on
its present state.
Our model has some similarities to the model for electronic service markets
presented in [9], in the sense that we also take into account customer waiting
time and not only the price of the service. In addition to modeling the waiting
times, our model includes a geographical component. Transportation costs
affect customer choices and consequently affect the decision of where each
supplier locates its business.
3 Concept Check: Citysim
In this Section we present a test model called Citysim. We demonstrate that
in this model it is possible for heterogenous strategies to coexist in the market
and to evolve to occupy specific niches. We examine the emergence of such a
behavior over a wide range of initial conditions and support the experimental
results with theoretic analysis of the model.
3.1 The Model
Citysim is a model of a city inhabited by two types of economic agents:
providers of a particular service, for example, gas stations or hairdressers,
and their customers. We assume that the properties of the customer side of
the society do not change in the course of a simulation. At the same time
the society of suppliers is expected to evolve to meet the demands of the
customers.
The assumptions of our test model are similar to those from the urban eco-
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nomics model of a monocentric city [13], and from the model of market areas
with free entry [11]. We intentionally built our model upon classical urban
economics models to ensure its practical meaning. It is important to note
though that the observations of the model’s behavior are not essential, they
are offered mainly to demonstrate that the results obtained by the means of
the proposed approach are, in fact, meaningful.
One issue with using evolutionary models is that the number of control vari-
ables might easily become uncontrollable. Typically, a researcher can guide
an evolutionary model by changing: (a) the parameters of the environment,
(b) the rules of interaction between agents, (c) the reproduction rules, (d) the
initial parameters and distributions, and/or (e) the internal settings of the
agents and agents’ strategies.
The number of parameters is high and it is a daunting task to study the
space of parameters thoroughly (and convincingly). The fact that the evolu-
tion of a system might take different paths depending on random events, such
as those used in the reproduction scheme or in pairing agents during market
activities, adds to the complexity. Worse yet, it is not always clear what pa-
rameters control the major trends in the system and what merely cause small
perturbations.
In this Section we tackle the problem of managing control variables by backing
up the evolutionary system by the corresponding analytical model.
We proceed by building a model of a monocentric city that serves as a market
for suppliers of some service. Suppliers are given free entry to the market, and
are allowed to position themselves when they enter the market and set prices.
Suppliers may enter the market with different sizes, meaning that they can
serve a different number of customers simultaneously. They use scheduling to
provide service to the customers at the earliest possible time. The net price to
customers accounts for the supplier’s price, transportation cost, and service
delay.
Next we apply a market area analysis to find what comparative advantage
each size supplier has, and under which circumstances.
3.2 General Terms
We consider a society of economic agents who live and interact in a circular city
of radius R. Anonymous customers come to the market for a single transaction
at random intervals governed by a stationary Poisson process with a fixed
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frequency λc:
tc
i+1 = t
c
i
− 1
λc
log U [0, 1] (1)
where U [x, y] is a random variable distributed uniformly on the interval [x, y].
The location of a new customer in polar coordinates is determined by the
following rules:
r ∼ U [0, R] and α ∼ U [0, 2pi] (2)
The rules imply that the density of customers is inversely proportional to the
distance from the center of the city 1 .
Upon entry, a customer looks for suppliers and chooses the one that provides
the service at the minimum cost. We define the net cost of service c as a
function of the supplier’s price p, distance to the customer d, and delay due
to servicing previously scheduled customers ∆t:
c = p + d× cmile + ∆t× chour (3)
where cmile and chour are cost per mile of travel and cost per hour delay re-
spectively.
Suppliers, in turn, enter the market at intervals governed by a random process
similar to the one used for the customers. A supplier is characterized by its
pricing strategy and the number of customers it can serve simultaneously,
also referred as the supplier’s size. Serving one customer takes size s supplier
one continuous hour and costs cwork(s), staying idle for an interval of time of
any length costs cidle(s) per hour. Both costs decrease with size to simulate
economies of scale:
cwork(s) = cwork(1)× (1− g)s−1 for s ≥ 2 (4)
cidle(s) = cidle(1)× (1− g)s−1 for s ≥ 2 (5)
where cwork(1) and cidle(1) are constants and g determines a gain due to the
supplier’s size.
1 Studies in urban economics suggest and support by empirical evidence the use
of a reversed exponential relation between population density and distance from
the city center (see, for example, [1,13]). We adopt a hyperbolic distance-density
relation for convenience of the analysis.
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A supplier maintains a schedule of all future deliveries and their prices; it is
paid after delivering the service. Each supplier is audited at regular periods
and removed from the market if its profit becomes negative.
3.3 Analytical Model
We impose the following set of assumptions on the equilibrium state of the
market:
Assumption 1 Suppliers operate at zero profit without idle periods, and do
not discriminate between customers. This assumption implies that a size s
supplier sets its price at a constant level of the work cost cwork(s).
Assumption 2 The market area of a single supplier is small relative to the
size of the whole city, hence the density of customer arrivals might be consid-
ered constant over each supplier’s market area.
Assumption 3 Market areas are circular and do not interfere.
Assumption 4 Inside each market area customers arrive at regular intervals.
Under assumption 1 a supplier of size s should attract a minimum of s cus-
tomers in its market area per hour. We refer to the smallest circular area that
can support a particular supplier as its support. The relation between the ra-
dius of the support ρ and the frequency of customers’ arrival per square mile
per hour ν is expressed as
s = piρ2ν (6)
We can use the equations (2) to find the frequency ν as a function of the
distance from the center r. Consider a part of a city ring with middle radius r
and width ∆. For small ∆-s a part of such ring with angular size ∆/r is
a nearly square region that accounts for a fraction ∆
R
× ∆
2pir
of all customer
arrivals. The frequency ν then can be expressed as the limiting ratio of the
fraction of customers appearing in the region to the area of this region by a
square:
ν(r) = lim
∆→0
∆
R
× ∆
2pir
∆2
λc =
λc
2pirR
(7)
From equations 6 and 7 we derive the radius of the support as
ρ(s, r) =
√
2rRs
λc
(8)
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The next step is to note that under assumptions 1 and 4 in equilibrium the
average delay that customers experience inside the support of size s supplier
is equal to 1/2s. Hence the net price that customers face on the boundary of
the support is
p(s, r) = cwork(1− g)s−1 + cmileρ(s, r) + chour 1
2s
(9)
Now we can equate prices at the boundaries of the supports of supplier sizes
s1 and s2 to find the distance from the center r at which they don’t have any
advantage over each other. Assuming s1 > s2 and solving for r we get
r¯(s1, s2) =
λc
2R

cwork [(1− g)s1−1 − (1− g)s2−1] + chour
[
1
2s1
− 1
2s2
]
cmile
[√
s2 −√s1
]


2
(10)
Although Eq. 10 allows us to find the boundaries between each pair of dif-
ferent supplier sizes, we also need a criterion that will show the comparative
advantage of one strategy over another as a function of the distance from the
center. To derive such criterion we equate prices at the boundaries with size
s2’s radius “inflated” by a coefficient γ to show the extra (over strictly neces-
sary) area where s2 is preferred by customers over s1. Solving for γ we get a
coefficient that is equal to 1 at r¯(s1, s2), and is increasing with size s2 gaining
a comparative advantage over s1:
γ(s1, s2, r) =
cwork [(1− g)s1−1 − (1− g)s2−1] + chour
[
1
2s1
− 1
2s2
]
cmile
√
2rRs2
λc
+
√
s1
s2
(11)
3.4 Analysis of the Analytical Model
Note that there are four degrees of freedom in both equations 10 and 11,
namely: (λc/R), (cwork/cmile), (chour/cmile) and g. The first one determines the
size of the simulated city and it is only of interest from the scalability point
of view. The other three variables influence the shapes and relative position-
ing of the city zones where having a particular size of service is relatively
advantageous.
Figure 1 illustrates how the size gain parameter g and the cost ratios influence
the preferences of suppliers. The figure shows three graphs in which size 1 to
5 has the highest advantage over size 3 as a function of the distance from the
center and some other parameters. In each graph we restrict (λc/R) and two
other degrees of freedom such that the horizontal line drawn at the middle of
each graph is the common intersection of all three.
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Fig. 1. Graphs displaying which of sizes from 1 (white) to 5 (black) has the highest
comparative advantage over size 3 (medium gray). The x-axis is the distance from
the center; the y-axis is (cwork/cmile) for the top figure, (chour/cmile) for the middle,
and g for the bottom one. The horizontal line in the middle of each graph is the
common intersection of all.
By studying the graphs in Figure 1 we may choose a set of parameters that is
of particular interest for us. For example, the common intersection line seems
to have all five sizes occupying noticeable niches in the market. Drawing such
conclusion, however, requires that the theory and the experimental results
have a reasonable degree of compliance. Therefore the next section is devoted
to showing that this, in fact, is the case in the suggested model.
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4 Evolutionary Environment
Our test model is a continuous time discrete-event simulation of a society of
economic agents: suppliers of a service and their customers. The customer
side of the society is assumed to be in equilibrium and does not change its
properties in the course of a simulation. The society of suppliers is the one
that evolves over time to meet the demands of the customers.
The restriction on the customer side is imposed to fix the scale of the sim-
ulation as well as to avoid imposing extra assumptions on the behavior of
customers. In fact, it is customary for the urban economics models to assume
a fixed distribution of the population density and a particular form of the cus-
tomers’ utility function. In our model though we have the freedom of changing
the parameters of the customer side during the simulation.
4.1 Supplier Strategies and Generators
We define a pair of supplier’s size and pricing strategy to be a supplier type.
A type is represented in the market by the corresponding supplier generator.
Each generator maintains a pool of information concerning the history and the
current state of its type suppliers. It uses the collected information to create
new suppliers of its type and provide them with an initial location, price and,
perhaps, other parameters specific to the type.
The probability that a supplier of a particular type will enter the market
next is proportional to the number of suppliers of its type that are surviving
in the market. There is also a small probability, referred to as noise, that a
new supplier is assigned a type at random. The noise allows types that were
once retired from the market completely to enter it again, perhaps, at a more
favorable time. It also suggests a way for completely new types to enter the
market, as we demonstrate later in Section 5.2.
In the experiments referred to in this chapter we have used two strategies
that exhibit sufficiently different behaviors. In both strategies a supplier ac-
cepts whatever location and price was suggested by its generator and never
alters them. Such restriction simplifies the analysis of the results, since only
generators are capable of learning and adapting to the market situation.
The first strategy, code named market sampler, involves sampling the city in
several locations to maximize the potential revenue flow given the state of the
market.The price and the number of samples it takes to place a supplier are
assumed to be distributed normally. The corresponding generator periodically
collects information on the price and the number of samples from the current
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suppliers that passed at least one audit. The information is used to estimate
the normal distributions mentioned above and merge them with the historical
ones.
The second strategy, price seeker, assumes that the “right” price and density
of the suppliers depend on the distance from the center of the city. The price
seeker generator attempts to estimate the most beneficial distributions of price
and density by observing the number and prices of the surviving suppliers.
Consequently, the location of a new supplier is chosen to reflect the beliefs
of its generator about the density, and the price is selected depending on the
distance from the center.
To summarize the important properties of the strategies, the market sampler
strategy is capable of pinpointing the best location to deploy a new supplier,
yet it assumes the same price distribution for every location. The price seeker
strategy can avoid unattractive locations and choose better prices on a global
scale, while lacking the precision in positioning its suppliers relative to their
rivals.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 “Reality Check” Experiments
Our first series of experiments with the Citysim model are aimed at verifying if
the derivations from the analyitical model are close to the results from actual
simulations.
The experiments were conducted for the following values of the previously
defined parameters: R = 100 miles, λc = 1200 or 1600 customers per hour,
cmile = 2 $/mile, chour = 10 $/hour. Costs cidle and cwork for size 1 suppliers
were set to 5 and 10 $/hour respectively and reduced by g = 5% with each
unit size gain.
In the following we will refer to four experiments: two with λc equal to 1200
and two with λc equal to 1600. For each frequency, one experiment involved
price seekers of sizes 1 to 5, and the other market samplers of the same five
sizes. The setup with customer frequency λc equal to 1600 corresponds to the
common intersection line in Figure 1.
All experiments were sampled after 200 periods 2 , which corresponds to ap-
2 Technical note: we used Java 1.4 (Sun JDK) for the simulation software. One 200
“period” experiment takes between 3 and 4 days of Pentium III 650 MHz processor
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proximately 2.4 billions of customer entries for λc = 1200 and 3.2 billions for
1600.
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Fig. 2. Results for customer frequency λc = 1200 and simulation time of 200 periods.
Graphs of γ(3, s, ·) for s = 1, . . . , 5 (top graph), and of approximate percentages of
capacity provided by suppliers of each size as a function of the distance from the
center. The middle graph is for price seekers, the bottom is for market samplers.
computational time.
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Fig. 3. Results for customer frequency λc = 1600 and simulation time of 200 periods.
Graphs of γ(3, s, ·) for s = 1, . . . , 5 (top graph), and of approximate percentages of
capacity provided by suppliers of each size as a function of the distance from the
center. The middle graph is for price seekers, the bottom is for market samplers.
Figures 2 and 3 show the results of the four reference experiments together
with theoretic predictions for γ(3, s, ·) for s = 1, . . . , 5. We use the percentage
of supplied capacity as a measure of supplier size’s dominance at a particular
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Fig. 4. Results for customer frequency λc = 1600 and simulation time of 600 periods.
Graphs of γ(3, s, ·) for s = 1, . . . , 5 (top graph), and of approximate percentages of
capacity provided by suppliers of each size as a function of the distance from the
center. The middle graph is for price seekers, the bottom is for market samplers.
distance from the center.
Observe that the trends in the experimental results follow the theory rather
closely. First, all five sizes acquire considerable shares of the market, with
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larger suppliers tending to stay in the center of the city. Second, the interval
around which size 3 has the highest representation in the market in the ex-
perimental results is not much different from the region where γ(3, s, ·) ≤ 1
for all s 6= 3.
It is important to note that although the theory predicts the general state of
the market quite satisfactorily, there exist noticeable discrepancies between
the results obtained using different supplier strategies. Most spectacular, the
separation of zones where one size is preferred over others is much more dis-
tinct in the price seeker experiments than in the market sampler ones. This,
however, is a sign that the evolutionary experimenting provides a richer frame-
work than the original theoretic model did.
1 2 3 4 5
supplier size
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
1 2 3 4 5
supplier size
Fig. 5. One quarter of the city populated by 5 sizes of market samplers after 200
period s (top graph). The bottom graph shows a black area of the top graph with
theoretic prediction of supplier supports (refer to Eq. (10)). Customer frequency λc
is 1600.
The key to the differences in the results of simulating our two test strategies is
in their deployment and pricing mechanisms. In particular, market samplers
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are designed such that upon deployment they explore the market in many
spots and choose the one that promises them a higher revenue flow. This leads
to a market structure where smaller suppliers can survive in between market
areas of the bigger rivals, much alike a basket of ping-pong balls mixed with
a basket of tennis balls fits in less than a two basket volume (see Figure 5).
Price seekers, in turn, lack the ability to pick the exact location of their de-
ployment, hence their survival depends greatly on the ability to secure the
supporting area by offering the right price. This explains why they follow the
presented theory closer — the theory suggests at what distance from the center
one should deploy to be able to sell at the minimum reasonable price. Indeed,
observing the example of the price seekers’ city in Figure 6 we may note that
it is more common for suppliers to deploy near one another, thus stressing the
ability to choose the right price.
1 2 3 4 5
supplier size
Fig. 6. One quarter of the city populated by 5 sizes of price seekers after 200 period
s. Customer frequency λc is 1600.
A more interesting trend is that from the way the supports, depicted in the
bottom part of Figure 5, overlap, it is clear that in the simulation the suppliers
are able of surviving in higher density then explained by the theory. One
reason for this is that in the simulation suppliers are not restricted by the
assumption 1 of the theory, hence they charge higher prices and derive non-
zero profits. Such behavior is necessary for surviving in the evolving market,
since the arrival of customers is random, and the positions and prices of rivals
are not guaranteed.
Our final observation is the distribution of average service delays faced by the
customers upon entry. Figures 7 and 8 show the distributions of delays for
customer entry frequency 1600, two supplier types, and two time points: 200
and 600 periods. We can derive several conclusions from the data:
(1) average delays are longer near city boundaries than in the center;
(2) in some areas delays are close to zero, confirming our guess that suppliers
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are packed closer than predicted, since at least some of them have idle
periods;
(3) in general, average delays are not much different from what is assumed
in theoretical derivations, i.e. 1/2s for a supplier of size s;
(4) in market seekers’ case, time delays become considerably more evenly
distributed, as a result of more even distribution of suppliers.
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Fig. 7. Distributions of delays for 5 price seeker strategies, for 200 periods (top) and
600 periods (top) (λc = 1600).
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Fig. 8. Distributions of delays for 5 market sampler strategies, for 200 periods (top)
and 600 periods (top) (λc = 1600).
5.2 Supplier Strategy Entry Experiments
We devote our next set of experiments to verifying the expectation that new
and retired strategies can enter the market by the means of randomly selecting
one of them with a small probability, or noise (refer to Section 4). In a properly
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functioning model it should be possible for new types of suppliers to acquire a
niche in an existing market. This does not imply that every strategy must win
a noticeable representation in the market, only that a reasonably competitive
strategy should eventually get its share when the market state is favorable.
In order to verify the viability of our ideas we have conducted a large number of
experiments using different market parameters, such as frequencies and costs
defined previously. The following analysis applies to an experiment 3 , which
starts with a city populated by price seeker suppliers of sizes 1, 2 and 3. Later,
market sampler suppliers of the same three sizes are introduced to the market
via a 10% noise factor (i.e. initially each of the new types gets less than 2%
chance every time a supplier is created).
The resulting distribution of entry probabilities for each of the six types is
shown in Figure 9. Each periodin the figure corresponds to 10, 000 simulated
hours and roughly 2.5 million of transactions 4 . The market samplers enter
the market at period 100 when the situation is relatively stable and try to
find their niche. Eventually, the size 3 market sampler type proves itself to
be competitive and captures a sizable share. In the following, we consider two
simulation periods: one at 110, soon after the market samplers’ entry, and the
other at 290, at the point of the major success of size 3 market sampler types.
These two periods are depicted in Figure 9 by vertical lines.
Figure 10 suggests a schematic view of the city at period 110. Each supplier
is depicted by a house of a particular shape, depending on the supplier’s type;
price seeker types are colored in white and market samplers are gray. The
concentric circles divide the city in ten equally wide zones with each zone
getting roughly the same number of customer entries per unit of time.
There are two important observations to be made from Figure 10. Firstly,
price seekers dominate the market and, indeed, their size 1 suppliers tend to
the rim, while size 3 operate mostly in the middle of the city and size 2 form
a ring in between the other two types. Secondly, the distribution of suppliers
is quite uneven with dense clusters and wide open areas situated at the same
distance from the center. The summary of the observations confirms that the
price seeker generators have little regard to the exact placement of suppliers,
while converging to the right distributions as a whole.
Figure 11 presents a view of the city at period 290 when the market is domi-
3 For the previously introduced parameters we used the following values: R = 50
miles, λc = 250 customers per hour, cmile = 0.5 $/mile and chour = 1 $/hour. Costs
cidle and cwork for size 1 suppliers were set to 5 and 10 $/hour respectively and
reduced by 3% with each size unit gain.
4 The probabilities are kept constant for the first 10 periods to let the generators
adjust their (or rather our) pretty volatile initial guesses about the market situation.
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Fig. 9. Probabilities of a new supplier entry for different supplier types as a function
of period numbers. Market sampler suppliers are introduced at period 100. Vertical
lines denote periods 110 and 290.
nated by size 3 market samplers and size 1 price seekers. The structure of the
market is evidently different from the one we witnessed 10 periods after the
market samplers were introduced – the size 3 market samplers are distributed
regularly across the city with the size 1 price seekers surviving in between and
in several remaining clusters.
To complete the comparison of the market situations we introduce Figure 12
with information on the prices and the costs that customers face at the two
considered periods. The left graph shows average prices and standard devi-
ations for the ten concentric city zones. The right graph shows the decaying
averages 5 for the customer costs in the same zones. Both graphs suggest that
the market populated with market sampler types exhibits more even price
and, subsequently, customer cost distributions.
It should be emphasized here that the most important conclusion of our ex-
periments is that a society of agents that use strategies based on different
approaches, information pools, and reproduction methods does evolve as one
society and produces meaningful results.
5 The concept of the decaying average is introduced to avoid storage requirements
of calculating moving averages in a large scale discrete event simulation. We define
the decaying average dai with a half-life T for the time interval [ti, ti+1) iteratively
as
wi = 1 + wi−12
−
ti−ti−1
T and dai =
vi + (wi − 1)dai−1
wi
where ti and vi are respectively the value and the time of the event i, and wi is the
weight of all events from 1 to i at time ti.
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Fig. 10. City snapshot at period 110. Price seeker suppliers are white, market sam-
plers are gray.
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Fig. 11. City snapshot at period 290. Price seeker suppliers are white, market sam-
plers are gray.
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Fig. 12. Average supplier prices with standard deviations (left) and 25 hour half-life
decaying averages of customer costs (right) for 10 concentric city zones at period
110 and 290.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We introduced the idea of building a large-scale evolutionary framework for
experimentation with heterogenous strategies on top of existing multi-agent
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systems. We have proposed an evolutionary framework where agents with
different pricing and location selection strategies compete in a market. New
agents are introduced with a probability proportional to the number of agents
with the same strategy already in the market. In this way, successful agents
have a greater probability that new agents with their same strategy will be
introduced in the market, and so have a better chance of creating a market
niche.
The evolutionary system produces several coexisting optimal strategies, not
only a single optimum one. In our test case, optimal strategies vary according
to the geographical location and size of suppliers, and depend on the state of
neighboring suppliers, and the general market situation.
7 Appendix: Summary of notation
Symbol Definition
λc Fixed frequency of the Poisson process for customers
arrival
R Radius of circular city
cmile Cost per mile of travel
chour Cost per hour of delay
d Distance to customer
∆t Delay due to servicing previously scheduled cus-
tomers
c Net cost of a service
s Size of service provider
cwork(s) Cost of serving a customer for a size s service provider
cidle(s) Idle cost for a size s service provider
g Gain due to supplier size
da Decaying average of customer costs
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